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SAN JOSE

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12  
13 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
14 **FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
15 **SAN JOSE DIVISION**

16 LAURA A. PLUMLEE, an individual, )  
on behalf of herself and all other persons )  
17 similarly situated, )

18 Plaintiff, )

19 vs. )

20 PFIZER, INC., a New York Corporation, )

21 Defendant. )

Case No. \_\_\_\_\_

COMPLAINT

CLASS ACTION

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

22  
23 This matter arises out of Defendant Pfizer, Inc.'s ("Pfizer") deceptive and  
24 unlawful marketing of the "blockbuster" antidepressant Zoloft (generically known as  
25 sertraline). Since Zoloft first entered the antidepressant market in 1991, Pfizer has  
26 engaged in a calculated campaign to mislead consumers and prescribing healthcare  
27 professionals about Zoloft's ability to treat depression. Pfizer knew that Zoloft's efficacy  
28 in treating depression was, at best, marginal and, at worst, nonexistent. However, in an

1 effort to turn a profit, Pfizer deliberately withheld material information from consumers  
2 and prescribing healthcare professionals and orchestrated a massive marketing campaign  
3 designed to convince consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals, in the face of  
4 the vast majority of clinical trial data to the contrary, that Zoloft was an effective and safe  
5 treatment for depression. This class action, brought on behalf of consumers nationwide  
6 and in California, seeks to enjoin Pfizer's continued unlawful conduct and recover  
7 damages for the millions of consumers who were tricked into purchasing a side-effect-  
8 ridden drug that was, at best, marginally better than a sugar pill in treating depression.

9 For her Complaint, Plaintiff Laura A. Plumlee ("Plaintiff"), alleges as follows:

10 **NATURE OF ACTION**

11 1. The vast majority of clinical trials designed to test Zoloft's efficacy have  
12 shown that Zoloft is no better than a sugar pill (placebo) at treating depression. The trials  
13 show that any perceived benefit consumers receive from taking Zoloft in treating their  
14 depression is primarily explained by the placebo effect—the perceived efficacy of a drug  
15 based upon one's belief that the drug works.

16 2. Long before Zoloft was put to market, Pfizer recognized it had an efficacy  
17 problem. Early clinical trials indicated Zoloft lacked efficacy and, under federal law,  
18 unless two clinical trials demonstrate a drug's efficacy, the Food and Drug  
19 Administration ("FDA") will not approve the drug. Knowing it only needed two positive  
20 trials, Pfizer organized several efficacy trials that, based on previous trial results, were  
21 carefully designed to show that Zoloft could beat a sugar pill in treating depression.  
22 However, despite Pfizer's best efforts, four of the six trials that were ultimately submitted  
23 to the FDA showed that Zoloft was no more effective than placebo and only two showed  
24 that Zoloft had some statistically significant effect. Additionally, even the two  
25 "successful" trials, which were marred by design flaws and sampling-bias, showed that  
26 Zoloft's effect on depression over placebo was very limited.

27 3. Pfizer submitted these two "successful studies" to the FDA, seeking  
28 approval for Zoloft in the treatment of depression. The FDA, however, found it difficult

1 to find efficacy in the face of so many clinical trials showing no efficacy. The FDA was  
2 also concerned that the observed benefit of Zoloft over placebo was marginal. After  
3 wrestling with the issues, the FDA ultimately concluded that the two trials were sufficient  
4 to meet the lax FDA efficacy requirements. Accordingly, Zoloft was approved for the  
5 treatment of depression.

6 4. Thereafter, Pfizer concocted a comprehensive and aggressive scheme to  
7 mislead consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals about Zoloft's efficacy. The  
8 scheme started with Zoloft's drug label<sup>1</sup>, which was and continues to be directed at every  
9 consumer and prescribing healthcare professional in the United States. Knowing that  
10 consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals rely heavily on the risk and efficacy  
11 disclosures in the drug label, Pfizer artfully omitted material information that  
12 contradicted the "efficacy" message. Zoloft's drug label, as it existed in 1991 and until  
13 the present, does not mention or discuss the numerous clinical trials in which Zoloft was  
14 shown to be no more effective in treating depression than placebo. Moreover, the drug  
15 label fails to disclose that the two clinical trials that supposedly demonstrate Zoloft's  
16 efficacy only showed a marginal or slight effect on treating depression. Instead, Pfizer  
17 concocted a description which, through the artful omission of material facts, conveys the  
18 impression that Zoloft is very effective for treating depression. Because the drug label  
19 contains material omissions of fact, Pfizer prevented consumers and prescribing  
20 healthcare professionals from having enough information to make an informed decision  
21 about whether to purchase or prescribe Zoloft.

22 5. Supplementing the misleading drug label, Pfizer also engaged in a larger  
23 scheme to mislead consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals about Zoloft's  
24 efficacy. Specifically, as discussed at length in this Complaint, Pfizer:

- 25 a. Selectively published clinical efficacy data by actively suppressing  
26 negative data and promoting only "good" data;

27  
28 <sup>1</sup> Throughout this Complaint, the term "drug label" refers to the product insert and various labels that are required by federal law to accompany a prescription medication.

- 1 b. Paid well-respected medical professionals to put their names on
- 2 articles authored by Pfizer to tout specific efficacy messages, all while
- 3 concealing Pfizer's involvement in the publication;
- 4 c. Paid key opinion leaders to tout Zoloft's efficacy;
- 5 d. Spent hundreds of millions on direct-to-consumer advertising and
- 6 physician-targeted "training" and sale-aids, designed to convince
- 7 consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals that Zoloft was
- 8 very effective at treating depression.

9 6. Pfizer knew that disclosing Zoloft's true efficacy to consumers and  
10 prescribing healthcare professionals would have drastically reduced the drug's revenue  
11 potential. So, instead of being honest and straightforward with consumers and  
12 prescribing healthcare professionals and allowing them to decide, for themselves, if  
13 Zoloft was worth the risk, Pfizer hid the efficacy data and mislead consumers and  
14 prescribing healthcare professionals. The deception worked. Since 1991, Pfizer has sold  
15 over \$30 billion in Zoloft to consumers within the United States.

16 7. Plaintiff Laura A. Plumlee ("Plaintiff"), like many Zoloft consumers  
17 within the United States and the State of California, purchased and ingested Zoloft for the  
18 treatment of depression. She believed, relying on Zoloft's drug label and Pfizer's  
19 extensive marketing and promotion, that Zoloft would help her manage the symptoms  
20 related to her life-long struggle with depression. Over the course of three years, however,  
21 Zoloft was not effective at treating her depression, even after increasing her dosage from  
22 fifty (50) mg to two-hundred (200) mg per day. Plaintiff, like many consumers within  
23 the United States and in California, was misled into purchasing an expensive and side-  
24 effect-ridden antidepressant that, according to most clinical studies, was no better than a  
25 sugar pill in treating depression.

26 8. Plaintiff brings this Complaint in two capacities. First, Plaintiff brings this  
27 Complaint on behalf of herself and all consumers within the United States, seeking a  
28 declaratory judgment that Zoloft's drug label is misleading and that Pfizer's conduct was

1 intentional, and an order enjoining Pfizer from continuing to unlawfully market Zoloft  
2 with its misleading drug label. Second, Plaintiff brings this Complaint on behalf of  
3 herself and all consumers within the State of California, seeking a refund of monies that  
4 were used to purchase Zoloft.

5 **PARTIES**

6 9. Plaintiff Laura A. Plumlee is, and was at all material times herein, a  
7 citizen, resident, and domicile of the State of California, County of Santa Cruz.

8 10. Defendant Pfizer Inc. is, and was at all material times herein, a New York  
9 corporation with its headquarters in New York, New York. Pfizer is, and was at all  
10 material times herein, a pharmaceutical company involved in the research, development,  
11 testing, manufacture, production, distribution, marketing, and sale of numerous  
12 pharmaceutical products, including Zoloft (generically known as sertraline). Pfizer  
13 regularly conducts business, including the sale and marketing of Zoloft, within the State  
14 of California and the United States of America.

15 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

16 11. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  
17 Members of the proposed nationwide class are citizens of different States than Pfizer.  
18 Furthermore, the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000.

19 12. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Pfizer because Pfizer has  
20 purposefully directed its marketing and sales of numerous pharmaceutical products to the  
21 State of California. Pfizer has had substantial contacts with the State of California such  
22 that maintenance of the action is consistent with traditional notions of fair play and  
23 substantial justice

24 13. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). A  
25 substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claims alleged in this Complaint took  
26 place within the Northern District for the District of California, specifically within the  
27 San Jose Division's jurisdiction.

28

**FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

1  
2           14.     The market for antidepressants is large and competitive. Since the  
3 emergence of “blockbuster” antidepressants in the 1980’s, a multi-billion dollar industry  
4 has taken hold in the United States and Europe. The antidepressant industry generates  
5 revenue in excess of \$11 billion each year and the market continues to grow annually.  
6 There are dozens of brand name and generic drugs approved by the Food and Drug  
7 Administration (“FDA”) for the treatment of depression. Due to the availability of so  
8 many different antidepressants, prescribing physicians and consumers typically “shop  
9 around” when trying to find the right drug. Thus, in order to remain competitive in the  
10 antidepressant market, pharmaceutical companies spend hundreds of millions of dollars  
11 each year promoting directly to consumers and the medical community. The number of  
12 drug commercials on television today speaks to the competitive nature of the industry.

13           15.     Pfizer is one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world with  
14 annual revenues exceeding \$65 billion. Pfizer is a leader in the antidepressant industry  
15 and has enjoyed considerable financial success from the manufacture and sale of Zoloft.

16           16.     Zoloft (generically known as sertraline) is a selective serotonin reuptake  
17 inhibitor (“SSRI”) in the same class of drugs as Prozac (generically known as fluoxetine)  
18 and Paxil (generically known as paroxetine). It has been theorized that reduced levels of  
19 serotonin in the brain are the primary physiological cause of depression and, through use  
20 of an SSRI such as Zoloft, one could “balance the brain’s chemistry” and increase  
21 otherwise deficient serotonin levels. Although scientists have never found evidence to  
22 prove the “balancing brain chemistry” theory, Pfizer has successfully used the theory to  
23 promote the use of Zoloft.

24           17.     The process of gaining FDA approval for a new drug involves several  
25 steps. First, the company must conduct laboratory testing in animals to determine  
26 whether the drug will be safe and, to some extent, effective. If animal testing indicates  
27 that the drug or compound is relatively safe, the company then submits an investigational  
28 new drug (“IND”) application to the FDA to gain approval to test the product with human

1 subjects. These tests are called clinical trials and are carried out sequentially in three  
2 phases—Phase I, II, and III studies. Each phase increases the number of subjects and are  
3 designed to test for safety and efficacy of the drug for specific indications and patient  
4 populations. After the clinical trials are completed, the company then compiles the data  
5 and analysis in a new drug application (“NDA”). FDA reviews the NDA with three  
6 major concerns: (1) safety and effectiveness in the drug’s proposed use; (2)  
7 appropriateness of the proposed labeling; and (3) adequacy of manufacturing methods to  
8 assure the drug’s strength, quality, and identity. Although the FDA evaluates the NDA to  
9 determine whether the drug will be salable to the public, the company manufacturing the  
10 drug always bears the responsibility of ensuring that the drug is manufactured, promoted,  
11 and labeled correctly.<sup>2</sup>

12 18. The history of Zoloft dates back to the early 1970s. A scientist at Pfizer  
13 named Reinhard Sarges discovered a new series of psychoactive compounds based on the  
14 structures of thiothixene, neuroleptics and chlorprothixene. This eventually led him to the  
15 development of tametraline, a weak dopamine reuptake inhibitor. The initial research  
16 into tametraline was halted after scientists noticed unwanted stimulant effects in animals.  
17 However, in 1977, two other Pfizer researchers, Kenneth Koe and Willard Welch, began  
18 working with some untested tametraline compounds, which produced a serotonin  
19 reuptake inhibitor. After the new drug was tested on animals, the chemical compound  
20 was named sertraline by Pfizer.

21 19. In the 1980’s, sertraline underwent human clinical trials for the treatment  
22 of depression, and in 1991 the FDA approved sertraline for the treatment of major  
23 depressive disorder (“MDD”). It was released by Pfizer under the brand name Zoloft in  
24 1991. In later years, Zoloft gained approval for the treatment of other indications  
25  
26

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27 <sup>2</sup> See *Wyeth v. Levine*, 555 U.S. 555, 570 (2009) (holding that, regardless of any FDA  
28 approval, pharmaceutical manufactures bear sole responsibility for the sufficiency of a  
drug label).

1 including obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,  
2 premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and social anxiety disorder.

3 20. Commercially, Zoloft has been an enormous success. It is estimated that,  
4 since Zoloft's launch in 1991, Zoloft sales have generated over \$30 billion in revenue for  
5 Pfizer. Prior to Zoloft's patent expiration in 2007, which resulted in a proliferation of  
6 less expensive generic versions of the drug, Zoloft's annual sales were over \$3 billion  
7 annually. Since 2007, however, Zoloft has sold approximately \$500 million each year.  
8 Currently, over 20 million prescriptions of Zoloft and generic sertraline are filled  
9 annually.

#### 10 **Pfizer Knew Zoloft Lacked Efficacy in Treating Depression**

11 21. Despite the general success of Zoloft over the last twenty years, numerous  
12 clinical trials and studies have demonstrated time and time again that Zoloft is no better  
13 than a sugar pill in treating depression.

14 22. The primary "benefit" some consumers perceive they get from taking  
15 Zoloft is from the placebo effect. The placebo effect is the effect that a drug has on a  
16 patient that has nothing to do with the drug, but is simply caused by the patient's *belief*  
17 that it works. During clinical trials, researchers must "control" for this effect by dividing  
18 a clinical trial population into a treatment group, who receive the drug, and a control  
19 group, who receive a sugar pill (placebo). Neither group knows whether the "drug" they  
20 receive is placebo or real. Thus, researchers can see if the effect created in the treatment  
21 group is significantly different than the control group. If both groups receive essentially  
22 the same benefit, then the drug at issue is no more effective than a sugar pill, and any  
23 observed benefit is simply a product of the placebo effect.

24 23. Because Zoloft is an antidepressant, the question of efficacy is particularly  
25 susceptible to the placebo effect. Unlike other ailments, where objective measurements  
26 are obtainable through blood and tissue samples, there is no physiological test for  
27 determining whether a given antidepressant is working on a patient. Rather, researchers  
28 must rely exclusively on the subjective articulations of the patient concerning their



1 depression. Thus, the potential for the placebo effect to drive the actual effectiveness of  
2 an antidepressant is very high. For example, in an analysis of efficacy data submitted to  
3 the FDA between 1987 and 1999 for six of the most popular SSRI antidepressants, 75 to  
4 80% of the response to medication was duplicated in placebo groups. Irving Kirsch et al.,  
5 *The Emperor's New Drugs: An Analysis of Antidepressant Medication Data Submitted to*  
6 *the U.S. Food and Drug Administration*, 5 PREVENTION & TREATMENT 23, 1-11 (2002).  
7 In another study evaluating the “relative benefit of medication vs. placebo across a wide  
8 range of initial symptom severity in patients diagnosed with depression[,]” the authors  
9 concluded that the “magnitude of benefit of antidepressant medication compared with  
10 placebo . . . may be minimal or non-existent, on average in patients with mild or  
11 moderate symptoms.” Jay C. Fournier et al., *Antidepressant Drug Effect and Depression*  
12 *Severity: A Patient-Level Meta-analysis*, 303 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 47-53, 47 (2010); *see*  
13 *also* Irving Kirsch et al., *Initial Severity and Antidepressant Benefits: A Meta-Analysis of*  
14 *Data Submitted to the Food and Drug Administration*, 5 PLOS MEDICINE 2 (Feb. 2008)  
15 (same findings). In fact, an analysis conducted by the FDA in 2006 of adult  
16 antidepressant clinical trial data showed that, while five out of every ten patients appear  
17 to respond to the drugs, in the same trials, four out of every ten patients respond to  
18 placebo. *See* Thomas P. Laughren, Dept. of Health and Human Services, *Memorandum:*  
19 *Overview for December 13 Meeting of Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee*  
20 (Nov. 16, 2006), *available at* [http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/briefing/2006-](http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/briefing/2006-4272b1-01-FDA.pdf)  
21 [4272b1-01-FDA.pdf](http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/briefing/2006-4272b1-01-FDA.pdf) .

22 24. Pfizer has known, since long before Zoloft was ever approved by the  
23 FDA, that Zoloft had an efficacy problem. In a March 8, 1984 memorandum<sup>3</sup>, a Pfizer  
24 employee, discussing a Zoloft efficacy report that needed to be submitted to the FDA,  
25 stated that the data “are not in favor of sertraline as the placebo group has the most  
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27 <sup>3</sup> All internal Pfizer documents referenced herein were produced in prior litigation and  
28 were either unsealed by court order or Pfizer agreed to retract its confidentiality  
designation.

1 beneficial response in all of these instances. As for the HAM-D [a depression rating  
2 scale used in clinical trials to measure changes in depression] . . . placebo still seems to  
3 be the most effective group in this subset of patients[.]”

4 25. Most of the early Zoloft efficacy studies proved to be negative, failed, or  
5 were neutral. In the majority of the efficacy studies, there was no clinically or  
6 statistically significant difference between Zoloft and placebo in relieving depression. In  
7 some studies, placebo actually outperformed Zoloft in treating depression. In other  
8 studies, Zoloft was shown to be less effective at treating depression than non-drug  
9 therapies such as St. Johns Wort or daily exercise.

10 26. It was because of Zoloft’s lack of efficacy that Pfizer had substantial  
11 difficulty in gaining approval from European regulators. In an April 18, 1991  
12 memorandum, a Pfizer employee expressed “serious concerns regarding the approval of  
13 sertraline in key European countries.” According to another memorandum dated April  
14 11, 1991, Pfizer “received an unfavorable review in a number of countries. The common  
15 key issue is that regulators are not convinced of sertraline’s efficacy versus placebo.”  
16 Pfizer recognized that an “analyses of [placebo controlled U.S. studies] strongly indicate  
17 that they are not highly convincing of sertraline efficacy versus placebo and will not  
18 provide the strong database required to overcome regulatory obstacles.” Pfizer, therefore,  
19 decided to create a “strongly positive, placebo controlled study . . . to ensure regulatory  
20 success.” This was to be accomplished by designing a study “to enhance the probability  
21 of success drawing on the knowledge gained from past trials[.]”

22 27. In the United Kingdom (“UK”), Pfizer improperly sought help in  
23 obtaining approval of sertraline (known as “Lustral”) in the UK from a consultant to the  
24 regulators reviewing Zoloft, Dr. Stuart Montgomery. According to an April 24, 1989  
25 memorandum, Dr. Montgomery told Pfizer he would remain a “disinterested party” at the  
26 U.K. Regulatory Agency until Pfizer appealed any negative decision and, thereafter, “he  
27 would be happy to act as an advisor to Pfizer and declare an interest.” In addition,  
28 according to a memorandum dated April 26, 1989, Dr. Montgomery provided Pfizer with

1 inside information that the UK regulators' decision on Zoloft was "borderline" at that  
2 time and that the company "should be wary of providing them with efficacy data against  
3 placebo[.]"

4 28. Pfizer submitted its new drug application ("NDA") to the FDA in 1990.  
5 As part of the application, six placebo controlled trials were presented to the FDA. Of  
6 the six clinical trials, four showed that Zoloft was no more effective than placebo in  
7 treating depression and two indicated that Zoloft had slight positive impact on  
8 depression.

9 29. The two studies that showed that Zoloft was more effective than placebo  
10 in treating depression, however, were severely flawed.

11 30. In the first trial that supposedly demonstrated efficacy, researchers  
12 enrolled 369 patients in a double-blind trial to test the efficacy of Zoloft at 50mg, 100mg,  
13 and 200mg against placebo. Within the treatment groups, *i.e.*, those taking Zoloft and not  
14 placebo, about 50% of the patients quit before the trial was completed—22% because of  
15 side-effects, 18% because it was not effective, and 10% for unexplained reasons. This  
16 large drop-out rate reduced the available patient population to 191. Of the remaining  
17 50%, *i.e.*, the population that did not quit Zoloft, the trial tracked patient changes in  
18 depression based on the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression ("HAM-D") over the  
19 course of six weeks. The HAM-D scale is a multiple item questionnaire used to measure  
20 a person's perception of depression. It is usually composed of 17-29 questions where the  
21 patient rates specific areas on a 0-5 point scale. A person's HAM-D scale rating can be  
22 anywhere between 0-70 depending on the scale used. The trial revealed that there was  
23 only a slight improvement in those taking Zoloft than those taking placebo. During the  
24 first four weeks of treatment, the study did not show any statistically significant  
25 difference on the patient's HAM-D scale between those taking Zoloft and those taking a  
26 placebo. Then, during weeks 5 and 6, the data showed that there was a slight statistically  
27 significant difference for the 50mg treatment group, although there was no significance in  
28 the 100mg or 200mg groups. The study showed that, on average, a person taking Zoloft

1 had a HAM-D scale improvement of about 2.3 points above those taking placebo after six  
2 weeks, which, depending on the scale being used, means that Zoloft, with its many  
3 documented adverse side effects<sup>4</sup>, appeared to be better than placebo by 1-5% after six  
4 weeks. This is an extremely small treatment effect and it was not associated with dosage.

5 31. In the second trial that supposedly demonstrated efficacy, researchers  
6 enrolled 448 patients in a double-blind trial and divided the patients into three groups—  
7 patients taking Zoloft at doses between 50-200mg, patients taking a different anti-  
8 depressant, and patients taking placebo. Much like the first “efficacy-establishing”  
9 clinical study, approximately 43% of people in the Zoloft treatment groups quit, 18%  
10 because of side effects, 9% because of a lack of efficacy, and 16% for other reasons. Of  
11 the remaining patients, the researchers tracked HAM-D scale changes over eight weeks.  
12 The trial’s data indicated that there was no clinically significant difference between  
13 Zoloft for the first six weeks of treatment, and that in weeks 7 and 8, a person taking  
14 Zoloft had a HAM-D scale improvement of about 3.5 points above those taking placebo.  
15 This was, again, a very small treatment effect, especially when one considers the serious  
16 potential side-effects attendant to Zoloft.

17 32. On November 19, 1990, the Psychopharmacological Drugs Advisory  
18 Committee for the FDA convened to discuss Pfizer’s Zoloft NDA. The focus of the  
19 meeting was to discuss Zoloft’s efficacy and safety. However, prior to the meeting,  
20 according to an internal Pfizer document dated September 5, 1990, Dr. Paul Leber,  
21 Director of the FDA’s Division of Neuropharmacological Drug Products, informed Pfizer  
22

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23 <sup>4</sup> Potential side-effects of Zoloft include: Nausea, insomnia, diarrhea, dizziness, dry  
24 mouth, fatigue, drowsiness, indigestion, loss of appetite, decreased sex drive (libido),  
25 increased sweating, burning or tingling sensation (paresthesias), headache (migraines),  
26 weight loss, abdominal pain, constipation, vision changes, hot flashes, nervousness,  
27 fever, hyperactivity, urinary incontinence, aggressiveness, sinus infection or  
28 inflammation, red or purple discolorations on the skin (purpura), suicidal thoughts or  
behavior, anxiety, panic attacks, chest palpitations, allergic reactions, impotence,  
glaucoma, high blood pressure (hypertension), hair loss, acne, weight gain, diverticulitis,  
muscle pain, menstrual problems, seizures, and ringing in the ears (tinnitus).

1 that the he would be “solicit[ing] the support of the Advisory Committee that the two key  
2 pivotal depression studies are adequate and well controlled.” He pointed out problems  
3 with the studies Pfizer had submitted to prove Zoloft’s efficacy and safety, but assured  
4 Pfizer that he thought he could convince the Committee that the studies were sufficient to  
5 recommend approval.

6 33. During the meeting, the committee members discussed the relatively small  
7 treatment effect of Zoloft on depression in the only two studies showing efficacy. One  
8 committee member explained:

9 [W]e have been provided with mean change scores from baselines and  
10 the outcome of statistical analyses for the difference in mean change  
11 scores between drug and placebo. However, it is difficult to determine  
12 the clinical significance of the statistically significant differences in  
13 mean change scores, particularly when you are looking at differences in  
14 change of only 2 or 3 points on the HAM-D total score . . . which is not  
15 a tremendous difference.

16 Transcript of Psychopharmacological Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting at 48  
17 (Nov. 19, 1990).

18 34. In addition, the committee members were very concerned with whether  
19 two studies, in the context of several others to the contrary, was sufficient to establish  
20 that Zoloft was effective for the treatment of depression. As one committee member  
21 stated:

22 Can I toss a few statistical issues as the statistician here? In a sense,  
23 what we have is not just an effect size problem but, in a sense, what we  
24 are trying to wrestle with is sort of an intuitive multiple comparison  
25 problem. If all we had was the two out-patient studies and they fairly  
26 clearly showed some Sertraline effect, we would have what I interpret as  
27 the criteria necessary for us to say go ahead and approve the drug. That  
28 is, we have more than one well-documented study that demonstrates an  
effect.

So the question is how do we interpret these two positive results in the  
context of several more studies that fail to demonstrate that effect? I am  
not sure I have an answer to that but I am not sure that the law requires  
me to have an answer to that – fortunately or unfortunately. That would  
mean, in a sense, that [Pfizer] could just do studies until the cows some  
home until he gets two of them that are actually statistically significant  
by chance alone, walks them out and says that he has met the criteria.

*Id.* at 90-91.

1           35.     Recognizing that the Committee was expressing considerable criticism of  
2 Zoloff's efficacy, Dr. Leber, the FDA Director who had previously pledged to help get  
3 Zoloff approved, told the Committee that:

4           I think it should be understood that all comparisons are probably odious.  
5           We do not have a comparative efficacy/safety drug law, although,  
6           clearly, clinicians using drugs are interested in determining relative  
7           efficacy, relative safety and relative utility - - whatever that means. I  
8           think you have to understand that when we face an application from a  
9           regulatory perspective, we are asked to face what the law requires us to  
10          do. We are obligated to approve an NDA unless our review finds that  
11          the drug is unsafe for use; that inadequate testing has been done to show  
12          that the drugs is safe. We are required to approve the drug unless we  
13          find that the tests submitted failed to contain substantial evidence of  
14          efficacy. That means more than one investigation which adequate and  
15          well controlled which would allow experts - - experts by experience,  
16          training and background - - to reach a conclusion that the drug is  
17          effective. And we are obliged to approve the drug unless we find that  
18          the labeling is false or misleading in some particular. . .

19           So if we can come back to the regulatory flavor of the questions, I think  
20           it would be useful.

21           *Id.* at 66-67.

22           36.     Dr. Leber further stated that “[w]e are always in a position of trying to  
23           make a fair judgment, knowing that we have to weigh the requirements of the law, the  
24           expectations of a public that wants freer access to new and effective drugs, even if they  
25           are not necessarily as potent on a milligram basis or even in terms of the size of the  
26           treatment effect as others.” *Id.* at 98. He then explained that “[w]e take the data base as  
27           we have it . . . At the end of that, we have to go back to the regulatory charge that I  
28           raised. It is not that they are entitled to every claim, every superlative ever made, but is  
29           the application, as submitted, such that we have a right to conclude it does not have  
30           evidence of safety for use; it does not have evidence of efficacy or it is inadequately  
31           labeled ... If we cannot reach those conclusions, you have to approve the application[.]”  
32           *Id.* at 98-99. According to Dr. Leber, he had “no idea what constitutes proof of efficacy,  
33           except on the basis of what we, as a Committee, agree on an as *ad hoc* case as there needs  
34           to be. You can be guided by the past but the inference is an abstraction – what is an  
35           antidepressant?” *Id.* at 69.

1           37.     Pfizer itself found it odd that the FDA did not question Pfizer about  
2 efficacy despite the fact that several European regulators were troubled by the drug's lack  
3 of efficacy. According to a February 25, 1991 internal Pfizer email between two of its  
4 employees: "There were no questions on efficacy . . . I find it odd that FDA not at all  
5 questioning efficacy and there are significant questions raised by several European  
6 companies."

7           38.     In the end, Dr. Leber's machinations worked. The advisory committee  
8 members voted 6-3 that Pfizer had "provided evidence from more than one adequate and  
9 well-controlled clinical investigation that supports the conclusion that sertraline is  
10 effective for the treatment of depression?"

11           39.     In an August 1991 FDA memorandum obtained through the Freedom of  
12 Information Act, Dr. Leber wrote about his recommendation that Zoloft be approved for  
13 marketing, stating that, "[i]n recommending this action, I have considered the fact that the  
14 evidence marshaled to support sertraline's efficacy as an antidepressant is not as  
15 consistent or robust as one might prefer it to be."

16           40.     In another FDA memorandum, in December 1991, Dr. Leber  
17 acknowledged that other foreign regulatory agencies were not willing to allow Zoloft  
18 marketing in their countries due to Pfizer's inability to prove efficacy. Dr. Leber went on  
19 to state, "I do not believe we can successfully introduce similar, more demanding  
20 requirements domestically, at least until there is significant 'sea change' in our society's  
21 collective attitude towards Federal regulation of new drug approvals." Dr. Leber warned  
22 that the FDA's approval of Zoloft was likely to be challenged because the FDA is not "as  
23 demanding as it ought to be in regard to its standards for establishing the efficacy of  
24 antidepressant drug products."  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 **Pfizer Deliberately Misled Consumers and Prescribing**  
2 **Healthcare Professionals about Zoloft's Efficacy**

3 41. Pfizer has deliberately engaged in a comprehensive scheme to prevent  
4 consumers and doctors from knowing or appreciating Zoloft's true efficacy in treating  
5 depression.

6 *The Drug label*

7 42. Zoloft's drug label has never properly stated Zoloft's true efficacy or  
8 given consumers or prescribing healthcare professionals sufficient information to  
9 determine, for themselves, if purchasing or prescribing Zoloft is worth the risks. When  
10 Zoloft first entered the market, it's product label stated:

11 ZOLOFT (sertraline hydrochloride) is indicated for the treatment of  
12 depression. The efficacy of ZOLOFT in the treatment of a major  
13 depressive episode was established in six to eight week controlled trials  
of outpatients whose diagnoses corresponded most closely to the DSM-  
III category of major depressive disorder.

14 43. In later years, Zoloft's label was amended several times. The most current  
15 version reads:

16 The efficacy of ZOLOFT as a treatment for major depressive disorder  
17 was established in two placebo-controlled studies in adult outpatients  
meeting DSM-III criteria for major depressive disorder. Study 1 was an  
18 8-week study with flexible dosing of ZOLOFT in a range of 50 to 200  
mg/day; the mean dose for completers was 145 mg/day. Study 2 was a  
19 6-week fixed-dose study, including ZOLOFT doses of 50, 100, and 200  
mg/day. Overall, these studies demonstrated ZOLOFT to be superior to  
20 placebo on the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale and the Clinical  
Global Impression Severity and Improvement scales. Study 2 was not  
21 readily interpretable regarding a dose response relationship for  
effectiveness.

22 44. Zoloft's drug label, as it existed in 1991 and until the present, is inherently  
23 misleading because it does not mention or discuss the numerous clinical trials in which  
24 Zoloft was shown to be no more effective in treating depression than placebo. Moreover,  
25 the drug label fails to disclose that the two clinical trials that supposedly demonstrate  
26 Zoloft's efficacy showed only a marginal or slight effect on treating depression. Instead,  
27 Pfizer concocted a description which, through the artful omission of material facts,  
28 conveys the impression that Zoloft is a very effective treatment for depression.



1           45.     This omitted information relating to Zoloft's efficacy should have been  
2 included in Zoloft's original drug label and those that followed, up to and including the  
3 current drug label. Doctors and consumers deserve to know what Zoloft's efficacy truly  
4 is and decide, in light of so many clinical trials demonstrating that Zoloft is no better than  
5 placebo, whether purchasing Zoloft is worth the risks. By omitting this material  
6 information, Pfizer has robbed consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals of  
7 having sufficient information to properly decide whether to purchase or prescribe Zoloft.

8                           *Selective Publication of Clinical Trial Data*

9           46.     Pfizer's deceptive drug label, however, is just one component of a larger  
10 marketing scheme designed to mislead consumers and healthcare professionals about  
11 Zoloft's efficacy. Specifically, Pfizer has engaged in selective and biased publication of  
12 Zoloft's clinical trials with the aim of promoting favorable studies and suppressing  
13 negative ones. Dr. Marcia Angell, the former editor of the New England Journal of  
14 Medicine and currently a senior lecturer in the department of social medicine at Harvard  
15 Medical School, has commented that "[m]any drugs that are assumed to be effective are  
16 probably little better than placebos, but there is no way to know because negative results  
17 are hidden." Marcia Angell, *Drug Companies & Doctors: A Story of Corruption*, N.Y.  
18 Rev. of Books, (January 15, 2009) *available at*  
19 [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/jan/15/drug-companies-doctors-a-story-](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/jan/15/drug-companies-doctors-a-story-of-corruption/)  
20 [of-corruption/](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/jan/15/drug-companies-doctors-a-story-of-corruption/).

21           47.     Pfizer was able to prevent the disclosure of unfavorable clinical results by  
22 making supposedly "un-biased" researchers agree to non-disclosure agreements and  
23 prevent the publication of any clinical data without first gaining express permission. In  
24 addition, Pfizer would expressly prohibit researchers from having access to underlying  
25 raw data to limit their ability to question, or challenge, the reported results. Then, if a  
26 researcher's clinical trial ultimately demonstrated a lack of efficacy, Pfizer would place  
27 the researcher on a "do-not-use-in-the-future" list.

28

1           48.     Selective publication of clinical trial data gives the impression that Zoloft  
2 is more effective than it actually is. A recent study published in the New England Journal  
3 of Medicine exposed this practice. *See* Erick H. Turner, et al., Selective Publication of  
4 Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED.  
5 252, 252-60 (2008). The study found “a bias toward the publication of positive results”  
6 and that a survey of published literature indicates that ninety-four (94) percent of clinical  
7 trial studies were positive, whereas only fifty-one (51) percent of the studies actually  
8 submitted to the FDA were positive. The authors state that “[s]elective reporting  
9 deprives researchers of the accurate data they need to estimate effect size realistically”  
10 and that, by “altering the apparent risk-benefit ratio of drugs, selective publication can  
11 lead doctors to make inappropriate prescribing decisions that may not be in the best  
12 interest of their patients and, thus, the public health.” More importantly, an estimate of  
13 how much the impression of each drug’s effectiveness was inflated by not publishing  
14 unfavorable studies revealed that Zoloft was the second to worst drug of those evaluated,  
15 with an estimated 64% inflated efficacy.

16           49.     Several of the most prestigious medical journals in the world, including  
17 the New England Journal of Medicine, the Lancet, and the Journal of the American  
18 Medical Association, recognized the problem of pharmaceutical control over study  
19 design and publication:

20           We are concerned that the current intellectual environment in which  
21 some clinical research is conceived, study subjects are recruited, and the  
22 data are analyzed and reported (or not reported) may threaten this  
precious objectivity.

23           [C]orporate sponsors have been able to dictate the terms of participation  
24 in the trial – terms that are not always in the best interests of academic  
investigators, the study participants, or the advancement of science  
generally.

25           Investigators may have little or no input into trial design, no access to  
26 the raw data, and limited participation in data interpretation. These  
27 terms are draconian for self-respecting scientists, but many have  
found someone else who will.

28

1 And, unfortunately, even when an investigator has had substantial input  
2 into trial design and data interpretation, the results of the finished trial  
3 may be buried rather than published if they are unfavorable to the  
4 sponsor's product. Such issues are not theoretical. There have been a  
5 number of recent public examples of such problems, and we suspect that  
6 many more go unreported.

7 Editorial, *Sponsorship, Authorship, and Accountability*, 345 NEW ENGL. J. MED.  
8 825-27 (2001).

9 50. By selectively publishing clinical trial data, Pfizer has been able to  
10 convince the public and the medical community that Zoloft is more effective than clinical  
11 trials indicate.

#### 12 *Pfizer's Ghostwriting Operation*

13 51. The clinical peer-review process is an integral component of the medical  
14 research field and pharmaceutical development. It allows new ideas and theories to be  
15 tested against the critical eye of fellow researchers and ferret out otherwise unfeasible  
16 approaches or products. Doctors rely heavily on published papers and the peer review  
17 process to gain insight into new and potentially life-saving advances in medicine, as well  
18 as to learn about potential dangers that were previously unknown. *See Puneet*  
19 *Manchanda & Elizabeth Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing*  
20 *in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review*, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &  
21 ETHICS 785, 796 (2005). In addition, the FDA and other regulatory bodies rely on the  
22 intellectual rigor and transparency attendant to the peer review process to keep apprised  
23 of important issues that fall within their regulatory jurisdiction. The success of this  
24 system is predicated on integrity and transparency. Doctors, regulatory officials,  
25 researchers, and even consumers make important healthcare and research decisions based  
26 on the belief that these studies are unbiased and accurate.

27 52. Pfizer understood that the best way to ensure the success of Zoloft was to  
28 convince the scientific and medical community that Zoloft was safe and effective by  
cultivating a body of "peer-reviewed research" to enhance Zoloft's credibility. To that  
end, Pfizer created a large-scale ghostwriting program. Pfizer would author, or have a  
medical communications company author, a study specifically designed to promote a

1 marketing message, *i.e.*, Zoloft's efficacy. Then, Pfizer would pay "key opinion leaders"  
2 ("KOL's") to put their name on the article and get the article published in specifically  
3 targeted medical journals. When the article appeared in the journal, there would be no  
4 indication of Pfizer's involvement.

5 53. Pfizer had an entire team devoted to the publication of positive medical  
6 journal articles about Zoloft. In addition, Pfizer worked with outside medical  
7 ghostwriting vendors to create a steady stream of Zoloft-positive medical journal articles.

8 54. Dr. David Healy, a psychopharmacologist and professor at the University  
9 of Wales College of Medicine, and a colleague conducted an analysis of Zoloft articles  
10 that were "coordinated" by a medical communications company called Current Medical  
11 Direction ("CMD"). Pfizer had hired CMD to promote Zoloft in the 1990's. David  
12 Healy & Dinah Cattell, *Interface Between Authorship, Industry and Science in the*  
13 *Domain of Therapeutics*, 183 BRITISH J. OF PSYCH. 22-27 (2003). According to the study,  
14 CMD coordinated over 85 medical journal articles about Zoloft during a three-year  
15 period. By early 2001, 55 of these articles had been published in journals such as the  
16 *New England Journal of Medicine*, *Journal of the American Medical Association*  
17 (*JAMA*), *Archives of General Psychiatry* and the *American Journal of Psychiatry*.  
18 Interestingly, all of the clinical trial results were favorable to Zoloft. The analysis found  
19 that "the CMD-linked articles report[ed] universally positive results" and that there were  
20 "significant discrepancies between published data and the raw data from the actual  
21 clinical trials." Most of the 85 articles appeared to have been authored by CMD and, in a  
22 number of instances, the authors were listed in Pfizer internal memos as "TBD" (*i.e.*, "to  
23 be determined"). The study concluded that:

24 The combination of distinguished journal, distinguished author, an  
25 efficient distribution system and sponsored platforms appears to have led  
26 to an impact on the therapeutics domain greatly in excess of 50% of the  
27 impact of the rest of the literature on sertraline. The impact of this  
28 literature on third-party payers and other interested parties is at present  
unquantifiable. The question of literature impact would seem to be tied  
closely to the nature of ghostwriting. Authorship lines from perceived  
opinion-leaders with minimal company representation and non-  
declaration of other non-academic authorship inputs increase the

1 likelihood that these articles will be influential with prescribers and  
2 purchasers.

3 55. Corroborating the study's finding, an internal company document shows  
4 that CMD kept a "Zoloft publications scorecard" for Pfizer which contained a running list  
5 of in-progress medical journal articles with details of the status, the names of the  
6 designated authors ("KOLs" or "thought leaders" in their respective fields), and the  
7 ghostwriting vendor to be used.

8 56. An internal PowerPoint presentation prepared by Pfizer in 2000, states  
9 that the purpose of the publications program was to, among other things, "promote  
10 efficacy[.]" "[h]ighlight drug's superiority to a competitor(s)[.]" "[l]everage good will  
11 with academic investigators[.]" "[i]ncrease media and public perception of the drug and  
12 Pfizer[.]" and "[p]rovide tools for sales force to drive prescriptions based on data[.]"  
13 The PowerPoint explains that the "bottom line" in publication projects is to "optimize our  
14 ability to sell Zoloft[.]"

15 *Paid-For Opinions and Conflicts of Interest*

16 57. Studies have demonstrated that "[a]uthors who had financial relationships  
17 with pharmaceutical companies were significantly more likely to reach supportive  
18 conclusions than authors without such industry affiliations" and "reports suggest that  
19 industry may alter, obstruct, or even stop publication of negative studies." Scope and  
20 Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 342 NEW ENGL. J. MED.  
21 1539-44 (2000).

22 58. One of the most powerful methods employed by Pfizer to promote  
23 Zoloft's efficacy, was directly paying KOLs to declare their support for Zoloft and  
24 concealing Pfizer's financial relationship with KOLs. In one internal Pfizer  
25 memorandum from 1995, a Pfizer employee stated: "With regards to the authors, we  
26 want to avoid a list of Pfizer names. One is acceptable as a study coordinator, the rest  
27 should be investigators who will be of benefit to the launch of Zoloft[.]" Pfizer  
28 deliberately concealed various doctor's financial relationship with Pfizer so they would  
have more credibility in touting Zoloft when it went to market.

1           59.     Dr. Marcia Angell, in reviewing a book about how conflicts of interest  
2 impact drug development, explains that “highly influential faculty physicians – referred  
3 to by the industry as ‘thought-leaders’ or ‘key opinion leaders’ (KOLs) . . . write  
4 textbooks and medical journal papers, issue practice guidelines (treatment  
5 recommendations), sit on FDA and other governmental advisory panels, head  
6 professional societies, and speak at the innumerable meetings and dinners that take place  
7 every year to teach clinicians about prescription drugs ...” Marcia Angell, *Drug*  
8 *Companies & Doctors: A Story of Corruption*, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, (January 15, 2009)  
9 *available at* [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/jan/15/drug-companies-](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/jan/15/drug-companies-doctors-a-story-of-corruption/)  
10 [doctors-a-story-of-corruption/](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/jan/15/drug-companies-doctors-a-story-of-corruption/). Dr. Angell explains that “[c]onflicts of interest affect more  
11 than research. They also directly shape the way medicine is practiced, through their  
12 influence on practice guidelines issued by professional and governmental bodies, and  
13 through their effects on FDA decisions[.]”

14           60.     Pfizer has employed through its ghostwriting and continuing education  
15 programs numerous KOLs in the medical profession. In so doing, Pfizer has found a way  
16 to insulate Zolofit and remain relatively unscathed by researchers in spite of its dismal, if  
17 not non-existent, efficacy.

18                           *Zolofit’s Massive Efficacy Promotion Campaign*

19           61.     After Pfizer was approved in 1991, Pfizer embarked on a massive  
20 campaign to promote Zolofit as an effective and reliable treatment for depression.

21           62.     The first arm of this campaign involved the “direct-to-prescriber”  
22 approach. Pfizer would “wine and dine” prescribing healthcare professionals to  
23 encourage them to prescribe Zolofit. Pfizer would pay prescribing healthcare  
24 professionals to attend various events, such as theater shows, sporting events, ski trips  
25 and pay for stays at luxurious hotels and meals at fancy restaurants.

26           63.     Pfizer also used a large sales force, long recognized as the largest sales  
27 force in the industry, to visit prescribing healthcare professionals on a routine basis to  
28 promote Zolofit. These sales representatives, who were typically young attractive people,

1 would visit prescribing healthcare professionals and “brief” them on how effective Zoloft  
2 was at treating depression. The sales representatives would leave behind free samples  
3 and various forms of product literature, all designed to give prescribing healthcare  
4 professionals the impression that Zoloft was a reliable and effective medication for  
5 depression.<sup>5</sup>

6 64. The second arm of Pfizer’s promotional campaign focused on media  
7 advertisements to prescribing healthcare professionals and consumers. These print and  
8 video advertisements gave the false and misleading impression that Zoloft was a  
9 tremendously effective drug for the treatment of depression.

10 65. For example, in a 2005 medical journal, Pfizer published an advertisement  
11 directed toward prescribing healthcare professionals which read:

12 Zo effective  
13 Zo well tolerated  
14 Zo trusted  
15 Zoloft  
16 Choose the #1 prescribed SSRI

17 66. In another advertisement, Pfizer claims “Zoloft has helped millions with  
18 depression.” In comic strip format, the advertisement tells a story about “Denise” who,  
19 depicted as a balloon-cartoon, is a music conductor that felt “an octave lower” because  
20 she “was depressed” and “had to do something about it.” However, before she went to  
21 the doctor, she “did some homework” and discovered that “Zoloft is the number one  
22 prescribed brand for depression[.]” So, Denise went to her doctor and he told her “it’s  
23 helped millions” just like Denise. In the next box, Denise “realize[s] that Zoloft was  
24 helping me at work and at home.” Beneath the comic strip, the ad states: “Denise took  
25 comfort in the fact that Zoloft has helped so many people for so many years. Zoloft is

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26 <sup>5</sup> Pfizer’s willingness to engage in illegal conduct with regard to the promotion of drugs  
27 directly to prescribers is well documented. For instance, in 2009, Pfizer agreed to pay  
28 \$2.3 billion dollars to settle government claims that the company aggressively promoted  
a number of its drugs, including Zoloft, for unapproved uses. *See LeAnne Gendreau,*  
*Pfizer to Announce Record \$2.3 B Settlement*, Associated Press, Sept. 2, 2009 (“The  
company aggressively promoted drugs for unapproved, off label uses, bribed medical  
professionals with cash and gifts and used thinly disguised kickbacks to hawk its  
products.”)

1 safe and effective. It has treated more people with more types of depression and anxiety  
2 than any brand of its kind. So she asked her doctor about Zoloft. Zoloft. #1 for millions  
3 of reasons.” This advertisement, much like others, carefully misleads consumers into  
4 believing Zoloft is more effective for treating depression than clinical data would  
5 suggest. Pfizer stresses that Zoloft has “helped millions” but that inference presupposes  
6 that Zoloft is what is causing the perceived benefit in consumers, not the placebo effect—  
7 a fact that is simply not supported by Pfizer’s own clinical research.

8 67. The combination of direct-to- prescriber and direct-to-consumer  
9 promotion convinced consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals that Zoloft was  
10 particularly effective at treating depression. Pfizer’s promotion, however, never revealed  
11 that the majority of clinical trials showed that Zoloft was no better than placebo.

12 **Plaintiff and Her Doctor Were Misled into Prescribing and Purchasing Zoloft**

13 68. On or about March 18, 2005, Plaintiff Laura A. Plumlee was prescribed a  
14 fifty (50) mg daily dose of Zoloft by her psychiatrist to treat ongoing depression. In later  
15 years, because Zoloft was not effective at treating her depression, her dosage was  
16 increased to one hundred (100) mg, then two hundred (200) mg, and then to four-hundred  
17 (400) mg per day.

18 69. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff’s physician was misled into  
19 prescribing Zoloft because he had been led to believe it was more effective in treating  
20 depression than it actually is. This deception occurred as a result of the same misleading  
21 conduct that was directed toward the Plaintiff—a misleading drug label and deceptive  
22 advertising.

23 70. Plaintiff continued to purchase and ingest Zoloft until shortly after Pfizer’s  
24 patent over Zoloft expired in June 2006. Plaintiff last purchased brand name Zoloft on or  
25 about August 11, 2006. Thereafter, Plaintiff purchased the generic version of Zoloft,  
26 sertraline until on or about June 2008.



1           71.     In total, between March 18, 2005 and August 11, 2006, Plaintiff spent  
2 approximately \$162 of her own money to purchase Zoloft and, with insurance payments,  
3 Pfizer received approximately \$3,315.

4           72.     Prior to ingesting Zoloft, Plaintiff read over Zoloft's drug label. In  
5 addition, prior to purchasing the drug, Plaintiff had seen several commercials (described  
6 more fully below) which indicated that Zoloft was effective for treating depression.  
7 Relying on the representations about Zoloft's efficacy on both the drug label and through  
8 Pfizer's direct-to-consumer advertisements, Plaintiff was induced into purchasing and  
9 ingesting Zoloft.

10          73.     During the period in which Plaintiff was purchasing and ingesting Zoloft,  
11 Plaintiff did not know that Zoloft's drug label and advertising were deceptive or that they  
12 lacked material information about the drug's efficacy.

13          74.     In early 2012, Plaintiff discovered that Pfizer had misrepresented Zoloft's  
14 efficacy, stating that it was more effective than it actually was. Plaintiff learned that the  
15 majority of clinical trials related to Zoloft's efficacy had shown it is no better than  
16 placebo. Given the risk of the serious and well-documented side effects associated with  
17 Zoloft, Plaintiff would never have purchased or ingested Zoloft if this information had  
18 been made known to her. In other words, Plaintiff had relied on the sufficiency and  
19 accuracy of Pfizer's advertisements and Zoloft's drug label in making her decision to  
20 purchase and ingest Zoloft to treat her depression.

21                   **NATIONWIDE ISSUE AND INJUNCTIVE CLASS ALLEGATIONS**

22          75.     This matter is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and those similarly  
23 situated. As discussed at length in this Complaint, Pfizer deliberately withheld from  
24 consumers that the majority of clinical trials designed to prove Zoloft's efficacy actually  
25 showed that it was no better than a placebo. Moreover, while Zoloft's drug label discusses  
26 the only two efficacy trials that show Zoloft was better than placebo at treating  
27 depression, it fails to include that the observed effect of Zoloft on depression was  
28 marginal at best. The Zoloft drug label fails to provide sufficient information to

1 consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals to make an informed decision about  
2 whether to purchase or prescribe Zoloft. Since Pfizer's misleading and deceptive drug  
3 label contains the core information that forms the basis for every Zoloft prescription  
4 written by a prescriber and filled by a consumer in the United States, consumers and  
5 prescribers were uniformly exposed to the same misconduct. Accordingly, this  
6 Complaint is uniquely suited for class-wide resolution, both in the context of an issue  
7 class and for injunctive relief.

8 76. The class is defined as follows:

9 All persons within the United States of America who purchased and/or  
10 paid for Zoloft manufactured and/or distributed and/or marketed by  
11 Pfizer from December 30, 1991 (the launch date of Zoloft) until the  
12 present for the treatment of depression ("Nationwide Class")

13 **The Nationwide Issue Class**

14 77. Pfizer sold the same Zoloft with the same misleading drug label in every  
15 state. Moreover, Pfizer's advertising and medical literature manipulation was directed at  
16 all consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals within the United States. Through  
17 advertising and the drug label, Pfizer failed to represent Zoloft's true efficacy as  
18 demonstrated by its own clinical trials. Pfizer knew that Zoloft was marginally, if at all,  
19 effective and deliberately withheld this material fact from consumers and prescribing  
20 healthcare professionals in the United States.

21 78. Rule 23(c)(4) provides that an action may be brought or maintained as a  
22 class action with respect to particular issues when doing so would materially advance the  
23 litigation as a whole.

24 79. In an effort to materially advance the litigation as a whole, pursuant to  
25 Rule 23(c)(4), Plaintiff brings Count I of the Complaint, as alleged below, on behalf of  
26 herself and the Nationwide Class to resolve whether Zoloft's drug label is misleading or  
27 deceptive. Specifically, the issues applicable to the Nationwide Issue Class are:

- 28 a. Whether Zoloft's drug label was misleading or deceptive because it  
did not contain any information about the numerous clinical trials

1 demonstrating that Zoloft was no more effective than placebo in  
2 treating depression;

3 b. Whether Zoloft's drug label was misleading or deceptive because it  
4 mentioned only two clinical trials that showed Zoloft could treat  
5 depression but failed to mention the negative studies and that the  
6 observed benefit was marginal or very limited;

7 c. Whether Zoloft's omissions were material, *i.e.*, whether the  
8 information should have been made available to prescribing healthcare  
9 professionals and consumers in order to make an informed decision  
10 about whether to purchase Zoloft; and

11 d. Whether Pfizer's failure to include this information was deliberate,  
12 intentional, or done with reckless disregard.

13 80. Because Pfizer marketed and sold the same Zoloft with the same drug  
14 label in each state, resolution of these questions would materially advance the litigation  
15 as a whole. Resolution of these issues would dispose of factual issues that are central to  
16 any consumer protection claim brought against Pfizer regarding Zoloft, whether those  
17 claims are brought individually or in other consumer class actions. Resolution of these  
18 issues would also materially advance a nationwide injunctive action against Pfizer, as  
19 discussed below.

20 81. The Nationwide Issue Class is properly brought and should be maintained  
21 as a class action under Rule 23(a), satisfying the class action prerequisites of numerosity,  
22 commonality, typicality, and adequacy because:

23 a. Numerosity: Individual joinder of the Nationwide Class members  
24 would be wholly impracticable. Zoloft has been purchased by millions  
25 of persons in the United States.

26 b. Commonality: Questions of law and fact are common to all members  
27 of the Nationwide Issue Class. Pfizer's misconduct was uniformly  
28 directed at all consumers and their prescribing healthcare professionals

1 in the United States. Since the issues presented by this Nationwide  
2 Issue Class deal exclusively with Pfizer's misconduct, resolution of  
3 these questions would be, by definition, common to the entire  
4 Nationwide Class.

5 c. Typicality: Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the  
6 Nationwide Class, because her claims arise from the same course of  
7 conduct by Pfizer, *i.e.*, deceptive and unlawful marketing of Zolofit.  
8 Plaintiff is a typical class representative because, like all members of  
9 the Nationwide Class, she purchased Zolofit that was being deceptively  
10 and unlawfully marketed within the United States.

11 d. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect  
12 the interests of the Nationwide Class. Her consumer fraud claims are  
13 common to all members of the Class and she has a strong interest in  
14 vindicating her rights. In addition, Plaintiff, and the Nationwide Class  
15 are represented by counsel who is competent and experienced in both  
16 consumer protection and class action litigation.

17 82. The Nationwide Issue Class is properly brought and should be maintained  
18 as a class action under Rule 23(b) because a class action in this context is superior.  
19 Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), common issues of law and fact predominate over any  
20 questions affecting only individual members of the Nationwide Class. The issues at stake  
21 here relate exclusively to Pfizer's conduct which was uniform across the entire class, *i.e.*,  
22 the misleading and deceptive marketing of Zolofit within the United States. Therefore,  
23 individual issues or defenses would be irrelevant for purposes of resolving the issues  
24 presented in the Nationwide Issue Class. The class issues fully predominate over any  
25 individual issues because no inquiry into individual conduct is necessary, just a narrow  
26 focus on Pfizer's deceptive and misleading marketing. In addition, this Nationwide Issue  
27 Class is superior to other methods for fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy  
28 because, *inter alia*,

- 1 a. Resolution of the issues presented on behalf of the Nationwide Class  
2 would materially advance the litigation of any individual consumer  
3 protection claim brought against Pfizer or any state-wide class action  
4 suits;
- 5 b. Resolving whether Zoloft's drug label was misleading or deceptive  
6 would allow individual claimants to bring claims with relative ease, as  
7 the individual claimants would only need to prove damages to recover  
8 for their consumer fraud claims;
- 9 c. Individual joinder of the individual members is wholly impracticable;
- 10 d. The economic damages suffered by the individual members is  
11 relatively modest compared to the expense and burden of individual  
12 litigation, thus consumers who have been otherwise harmed would be  
13 less likely to pursue claims against Pfizer;
- 14 e. The court system would benefit from a class action because individual  
15 litigation would overload court dockets and magnify the delay and  
16 expense to all parties;
- 17 f. The class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and  
18 provides the benefit of comprehensive supervision by a single court  
19 with economies of scale; and
- 20 g. Individual litigation by members would not be effective in stopping  
21 Pfizer's deceptive and unlawful conduct which will continue unless  
22 stopped through a class action lawsuit.

23 **The Nationwide Injunctive Class**

24 83. Rules 23(b)(1) and (2) contemplate a class action for purposes of seeking  
25 class-wide injunctive relief. Here, Pfizer has engaged in conduct that has resulted in  
26 misleading consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals about Zoloft's efficacy.  
27 Since Pfizer's conduct has been uniformly directed at all consumers and prescribing  
28 healthcare professionals in the United States, and the conduct continues presently,

1 injunctive relief on a class-wide basis is a viable and suitable solution to remedy Pfizer's  
2 continuing misconduct.<sup>6</sup>

3 84. The Injunctive Class is properly brought and should be maintained as a  
4 class action under Rule 23(a), satisfying the class action prerequisites of numerosity,  
5 commonality, typicality, and adequacy because:

6 a. Numerosity: Individual joinder of the Injunctive Class members  
7 would be wholly impracticable. Zoloft has been purchased by millions  
8 of persons in the United States.

9 b. Commonality: Questions of law and fact are common to all members  
10 of the Nationwide Injunctive Class. Pfizer's misconduct was  
11 uniformly directed at all consumers and their prescribing healthcare  
12 professionals in the United States. Thus, all members of the  
13 Nationwide Class have a common cause against Pfizer to stop its  
14 unlawful conduct through an injunction. Since the issues presented by  
15 this Injunctive Class deal exclusively with Pfizer's misconduct,  
16 resolution of these questions would be, by definition, common to the  
17 entire Nationwide Injunctive Class. Moreover, there are common  
18 questions of law and fact inherent in the resolution of a Nationwide  
19 Injunctive Class, including, *inter alia*,:

20 i. Resolution of the issues presented in the Nationwide Issue  
21 Class;

22 ii. Whether members of the Nationwide Class will continue to  
23 suffer harm by virtue of Pfizer's unlawful and deceptive  
24 marketing of Zoloft and its impact on the labeling of the drug  
25 for generic manufacturers; and  
26

---

27 <sup>6</sup> Since all generic manufacturers of drugs are required to replicate the label that exists on  
28 the brand name drug, enjoining Pfizer from continuing to use the misleading label on its  
brand name Zoloft will also force generic manufacturers to change their misleading label.

1           iii. Whether, on equitable grounds, Pfizer should be prevented  
2           from continuing to omit material information from Zoloft's  
3           drug label; and

4           c. Typicality: Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the  
5           Nationwide Injunctive Class, because her claims arise from the same  
6           course of conduct by Pfizer, *i.e.*, deceptive and unlawful marketing  
7           practices, including the publication of misleading drug label, related to  
8           Zoloft. Plaintiff is a typical class representative because, like all  
9           members of the National Injunctive Class, she purchased Zoloft in the  
10          United States and Zoloft was sold unfairly, deceptively, and  
11          unlawfully to consumers within the United States.

12          d. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect  
13          the interests of the Nationwide Injunctive Class. Her consumer  
14          protection claims are common to all members of the Nationwide  
15          Injunctive Class and she has a strong interest in vindicating her rights.  
16          In addition, Plaintiff and the Nationwide Injunctive Class are  
17          represented by counsel who is competent and experienced in both  
18          consumer protection and class action litigation.

19          85.     The Nationwide Injunctive Class is properly brought and should be  
20          maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b) because a class action in this context is  
21          superior.

22          a. With regard to Rule 23(b)(1)(A), resolution of the issues presented for  
23          the Nationwide Injunctive Class on an individual basis would pose a  
24          serious risk of requiring Pfizer to follow inconsistent courses of  
25          continuing conduct. One court could determine that the Zoloft drug  
26          label was partially misleading and order Pfizer to take specific action.  
27          Another court could also determine that Zoloft's drug label was  
28          defective but order a conflicting course of conduct. If the issues

1 presented for this Nationwide Injunctive Class are not dealt with by a  
2 single court, there is a very real possibility that Pfizer would be  
3 subjected to an inescapable legal quagmire of not being able to comply  
4 with one judgment without violating terms of another.

5 b. With regard to Rule 23(b)(2), Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on behalf  
6 of the members on grounds generally applicable to the entire  
7 Nationwide Injunctive Class. Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is  
8 appropriate because Pfizer has acted or refused to act on grounds that  
9 apply generally to the Nationwide Injunctive Class, *i.e.*, Pfizer has  
10 marketed the same Zoloft using the same misleading drug label and  
11 advertisements to all the class members. Any final injunctive or  
12 declaratory relief would benefit the entire Nationwide Injunctive Class  
13 as Pfizer would be prevented from continuing its unlawful and  
14 deceptive marketing practices and be required to honestly disclose to  
15 consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals the true efficacy of  
16 Zoloft in treating depression.

17 **CALIFORNIA CONSUMER CLASS ALLEGATIONS**

18 86. Pfizer's misleading and deceptive marketing of Zoloft was directed toward  
19 consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals in the State of California. Moreover,  
20 the deceptive conduct directed at California consumers and prescribing healthcare  
21 professionals was uniform—the same misleading drug label was directed at every  
22 California citizen who purchased Zoloft. Accordingly, in light of Pfizer's deceptive  
23 marketing / material omissions related to Zoloft's true efficacy, Plaintiff brings three  
24 consumer protection causes of action against Pfizer on behalf of herself and those  
25 similarly situated California Consumers.

26 87. The California Consumer Class is defined as follows:

27 All persons within the State of California who purchased and/or paid for  
28 Zoloft manufactured and/or distributed and/or marketed by Pfizer from  
December 30, 1991 (the launch date of Zoloft) until the present for the



1 treatment of depression, and who are not seeking a personal injury claim  
2 against Pfizer related to Zoloft (“California Consumer Class”)

3 88. Pfizer’s failure to include information about the numerous clinical trials  
4 showing that Zoloft was no more effective than placebo and failure to specify that, in the  
5 two trials in which Zoloft showed an effect, its effect was marginal or very limited, were  
6 material omissions. Accordingly, failure to properly represent these material facts to  
7 California consumers (the California Consumer Class), and prescribing healthcare  
8 professionals robbed them of being able to make an informed decision about purchasing  
9 or prescribing Zoloft.

10 89. Plaintiff brings Counts II, III, and IV against Pfizer, on behalf of herself,  
11 and all those similarly situated, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

12 90. The California Consumer Class is properly brought and should be  
13 maintained as a class action under Rule 23(a), satisfying the class action prerequisites of  
14 numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy because:

- 15 a. Numerosity: Individual joinder of the California Consumer Class  
16 members would be wholly impracticable. Millions of Zoloft  
17 prescriptions have been filled in the State of California by millions of  
18 consumers.
- 19 b. Commonality: Questions of law and fact are common to all members  
20 of the California Consumer Class. Pfizer’s misconduct was uniformly  
21 directed at all consumers and their prescribing healthcare professionals  
22 in California through the use of a misleading drug label. Thus, all  
23 members of the California Consumer Class have a common cause of  
24 action, here Counts II, III, and IV, against Pfizer, which involve  
25 common issues of fact and law applicable to all California Consumer  
26 Class members.
- 27 c. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the  
28 California Consumer Class, because her claims arise from the same  
course of conduct by Pfizer, *i.e.*, deceptive and unlawful marketing

1 practices related to Zoloft. Plaintiff is a typical class representative  
2 because, like all members of the California Consumer Class, she  
3 purchased Zoloft in California and the Zoloft that was sold was  
4 unfairly, deceptively and unlawfully marketed to consumers within  
5 California.

6 d. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect  
7 the interests of the California Consumer Class. Her consumer  
8 protection claims are common to all members of the California  
9 Consumer Class and she has a strong interest in vindicating her rights.  
10 In addition, Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class are  
11 represented by counsel who is competent and experienced in both  
12 consumer protection and class action litigation.

13 91. The California Consumer Class is properly brought and should be  
14 maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b) because a class action in this context is  
15 superior. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), common issues of law and fact predominate over  
16 any questions affecting only individual members of the California Consumer Class.  
17 Pfizer deliberately concealed material facts about Zoloft's efficacy, and in so doing,  
18 deprived all California consumers of making an informed decision to purchase a  
19 prescription drug. Under California law, individual reliance can be imputed on a class-  
20 wide basis when the company failed to disclose a material fact about the product, here the  
21 true efficacy data of Zoloft. The efficacy of a drug is, by definition, a material  
22 component of whether a consumer will purchase a drug—no consumer would knowingly  
23 purchase a side-effect-ridden sugar pill. Thus, under California's various consumer  
24 protection laws, the question of Pfizer's conduct, *i.e.*, whether the drug label was  
25 misleading, predominates over any individual issues. In addition, proceeding with a  
26 California Consumer Class action is superior to other methods for fair and efficient  
27 adjudication of this controversy because, *inter alia*,

28 a. Individual joinder of the individual members is wholly impracticable;



1 professionals and consumers in order to make an informed decision  
2 about whether to purchase Zoloft; and

3 d. Whether Pfizer's failure to include this information was deliberate,  
4 intentional, or done with reckless disregard of the truth of its product's  
5 efficacy.

6 94. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, this Court may "declare the rights and legal  
7 relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is  
8 or could be sought."

9 95. Pfizer has failed to include material information regarding Zoloft's  
10 efficacy in its drug label by failing to properly disclose the numerous clinical trials  
11 showing that Zoloft is no more effective than placebo in the treatment of depression and  
12 failing to describe the marginal benefits in the treatment of depression observed in the  
13 two clinical trials purporting to show Zoloft's efficacy.

14 96. Resolution of these issues would materially advance individual claims for  
15 consumer fraud against Pfizer and materially advance the litigation on behalf of the  
16 California Consumer Class.

17 **COUNT II**  
18 **CALIFORNIA CONSUMERS CLASS**  
19 **VIOLATIONS OF CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750, ET SEQ.**

20 97. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every prior and subsequent  
21 allegation of this Complaint as if fully restated here.

22 98. California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, *et*  
23 *seq.* makes it unlawful to engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or  
24 deceptive acts or practices intended to result, or which result, in the sale or lease of goods  
25 or services to any consumer.

26 99. Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class were, and continue to be, at  
27 all times material to the Complaint, "consumers" and "persons" as defined by the Cal.  
28 Civ. Code § 1761. Plaintiff and California Consumer Class purchased and/or paid for  
Zoloft for personal and/or family and/or household use during the relevant time period.

1           100. As alleged throughout this Complaint, Pfizer deliberately engaged in  
2 deceptive and unlawful marketing in violation of Civ. Code § 1770(a) by representing to  
3 the Plaintiff and California Consumer Class that Zoloft was more effective at treating  
4 depression than it actually was. Pfizer failed to adequately disclose material information  
5 about Zoloft's efficacy and, in so doing, deprived consumers of an ability to make an  
6 informed decision.

7           101. Specifically, Pfizer violated the following proscribed practices pursuant to  
8 Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a) with the purpose of inducing Plaintiff and the California  
9 Consumer Class to purchase and ingest Zoloft:

10           a. § 1770(a)(2): Pfizer represented to Plaintiff and the California  
11 Consumer Class that Zoloft was proven to be superior to placebo in  
12 two clinical trials, however, failed to mention that a large percentage  
13 of the trial group quit the trial because it lacked efficacy and caused  
14 severe side-effects. This gave a false certification of Zoloft's efficacy  
15 because the clinical trial results, as represented by Pfizer, were skewed  
16 and Pfizer was aware of this problem. Moreover, omitting material  
17 information concerning to the actual results of those two clinical trials  
18 and concealing the results of numerous clinical trials showing that  
19 Zoloft was no more effective than placebo was a false certification of  
20 the drug's efficacy.

21           b. § 1770(a)(5): Pfizer represented to Plaintiff and the California  
22 Consumer Class that Zoloft has a specific use, benefit, or characteristic  
23 which it did not have, to wit, that Zoloft is more effective for the  
24 treatment of depression than it actually is. Omitting material  
25 information about the actual results of two clinical trials purporting to  
26 show Zoloft's efficacy and concealing the results of numerous clinical  
27 trials showing that Zoloft was no more effective than placebo  
28

1 constituted a misrepresentation concerning a use, benefit, or  
2 characteristic.

3 c. § 1770(a)(7): Pfizer misrepresented to Plaintiff and the California  
4 Consumer Class that Zoloft was of a particular standard, quality, or  
5 grade., *i.e.*, substantially effective for the treatment of depression. In  
6 truth, Zoloft was not as effective as Zoloft's drug label represented,  
7 because there were numerous studies showing that Zoloft is no more  
8 effective at treating depression than placebo. Moreover, Pfizer's  
9 failure to properly disclose Zoloft's marginal benefit in treating  
10 depression, as observed in the two clinical trials purporting to show  
11 Zoloft's efficacy, constituted a misrepresentation of a material  
12 standard, quality, or grade.

13 d. § 1770(a)(9): Pfizer advertised to Plaintiff and the California  
14 Consumer Class that Zoloft was an effective and safe drug for the  
15 treatment of depression, when in truth, Pfizer knew that Zoloft was  
16 more than likely ineffective at treating depression. Pfizer concealed  
17 this information from Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class by  
18 omitting material information about the actual results of two clinical  
19 trials purporting to show Zoloft's efficacy and concealing the results of  
20 numerous clinical trials showing that Zoloft was no more effective  
21 than placebo.

22 102. Pfizer's concealment of numerous clinical studies showing that Zoloft was  
23 no better than placebo, and its failure to adequately describe Zoloft's marginal effect on  
24 depression, was a material omission that consumers and prescribing healthcare  
25 professionals should have known about prior to purchasing or prescribing Zoloft for the  
26 treatment of depression.

27 103. Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class lost money as a result of  
28 Pfizer's deceptive and unlawful marketing practices pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §

1 1770(a), through the purchase of Zoloft that was illegally advertised and marketed in  
2 violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a).

3 104. As a result of Pfizer's violations of California's Consumer Legal  
4 Remedies Act, Plaintiff seeks an order of this Court permanently enjoining Pfizer from  
5 perpetrating its deceptive and unlawful marketing practices. Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §  
6 1782(d), if Pfizer does not take action to cease its deceptive and unlawful marketing  
7 practices and amend the current drug label to accurately reflect the efficacy of Zoloft within  
8 thirty (30) days of being served with this Complaint, Plaintiff will amend this Complaint  
9 to seek, in addition to an order enjoining Pfizer from continuing its deceptive and  
10 unlawful practices, an order awarding, *inter alia*, Plaintiff and the California Consumer  
11 Class actual damages, restitution, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and for  
12 such other relief as set forth below.

13 **COUNT III**  
14 **CALIFORNIA CONSUMERS CLASS**  
15 **VIOLATIONS OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, ET SEQ.**

16 105. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every prior and subsequent  
17 allegation of this Complaint as if fully restated here.

18 106. California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§  
19 17200, *et seq.*, protects both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in  
20 commercial markets for goods and services. California's Unfair Competition Law is  
21 interpreted broadly and provides a cause of action for any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent  
22 business act or practice. Any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice that  
23 causes injury to consumers falls within the ambit of California's Unfair Competition  
24 Law.

25 107. Pfizer engaged in substantial advertising and marketing of Zoloft within  
26 the State of California.

27 108. Because of Pfizer's unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair business practices,  
28 Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class were misled into purchasing and using  
Zoloft.

**Unlawful Business Practices**

1  
2 109. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Pfizer has engaged in the  
3 unlawful business practice of misleading Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class  
4 regarding Zoloft's true efficacy. Pfizer's deceptive and unlawful marketing practices  
5 have violated numerous California laws, including, *inter alia*: Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1709, *et*  
6 *seq.* (fraudulent deceit); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1571, *et seq.* (fraud); Cal. U. Com. Code §§  
7 2313-15 (breach of express and implied warranty); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, *et*  
8 *seq.* (false advertising and marketing); and Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, *et seq.* (violations of  
9 California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act).

10 110. As a result of Pfizer's unlawful business practices, Plaintiff and the  
11 California Consumer Class purchased Zoloft without sufficient information regarding a  
12 material aspect of the drug. Specifically, Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class  
13 were misled into believing that Zoloft is more effective at treating depression than it  
14 actually is. Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class reasonably relied upon Pfizer's  
15 misrepresentations regarding Zoloft in deciding whether to purchase and use the drug.

16 111. In addition to engaging in unlawful marketing practices, Pfizer also  
17 engaged in an unlawful method of competition. Pfizer deliberately misled Plaintiff and  
18 the California Consumer Class about Zoloft's efficacy and thereby artificially inflated  
19 Zoloft's price on the open market. Because Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class  
20 were unaware of Zoloft's marginal-at-best ability to treat depression, they were more  
21 likely to purchase Zoloft as opposed to a competing antidepressant. The market was  
22 unable to correctly value Zoloft and, therefore, Pfizer gained an unlawful competitive  
23 advantage over competing antidepressant drugs. This unlawful method of competition  
24 resulted in Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class paying a substantially higher price  
25 for Zoloft than it was actually worth.



**Fraudulent Business Practices**

112. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Pfizer has engaged in the fraudulent business practice of misleading Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class regarding Zoloft's efficacy.

113. A business act or practice is "fraudulent" under California's Unfair Competition Law if it actually deceives or is likely to deceive members of the consuming public.

114. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Pfizer engaged in a comprehensive scheme to mislead consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals regarding Zoloft's ability to treat depression. Because of Pfizer's fraudulent business practices, Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class were misled about Zoloft's ability to treat depression and, accordingly, purchased Zoloft without knowing a material aspect of the drug.

**Unfair Business Practices**

115. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Pfizer has engaged in an unfair business practice of misleading Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class regarding Zoloft's ability to treat depression.

116. A business practice is unfair when it offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.

117. Pfizer's deceptive and unlawful marketing practices offend public policy and are fundamentally immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. Pfizer's scheme was to mislead consumers about Zoloft's efficacy by hiding the majority of clinical trials showing Zoloft does not work while grossly over-stating its efficacy. This conduct offends any notion of public policy and is truly unethical. Moreover, since Zoloft is, at best, marginally effective at treating depression, consumers who were tricked into purchasing the drug will suffer the risk of

1 the many serious side-effects attendant to Zoloft and, in return, get little to no relief for  
2 their depression from the drug.

3 118. The harm to Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class caused by  
4 Pfizer's unfair business practices outweighs any countervailing benefits to consumers or  
5 competition, and could not reasonably have been known and avoided by consumers.  
6 Furthermore, Pfizer's unfair business practices cannot be excused for any business  
7 justification, motive, or rationale in light of the severity of Pfizer's misconduct and the  
8 harm caused to Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class.

9 119. As a result of Pfizer's violations of the UCL, Plaintiff seeks an order of  
10 this Court enjoining Pfizer from continuing this unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair practices  
11 and awarding Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class, *inter alia*, actual damages,  
12 restitution, a disgorgement of Pfizer's profits, and for such other relief set forth below.

13 **COUNT IV**  
14 **CALIFORNIA CONSUMER CLASS**  
15 **VIOLATIONS OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500, ET SEQ.**

16 120. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every prior and subsequent  
17 allegation of this Complaint as if fully restated here.

18 121. Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class bring a cause of action against  
19 Pfizer pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, *et seq.* ("California's False  
20 Advertising Law").

21 122. The purpose of California's False Advertising Law is to protect consumers  
22 from false or misleading advertising and promotions. California's False Advertising Law  
23 prohibits the false or deceptive advertising of products to consumers in any form of  
24 media, when the company placing the advertisement knows, or should have known, that  
25 the advertisement would be likely to mislead consumers about a material aspect of a  
26 product.

27 123. Pfizer has used advertising on its packaging and through various media  
28 outlets to sell and market Zoloft directly to consumers. The advertisements and labeling

1 are deceptive, untrue, or misleading within the meaning of the California's False  
2 Advertising Law because they misstate observed efficacy of Zoloft in treating depression.

3 124. In making and disseminating the statements alleged herein, Pfizer knew or  
4 should have known that the statements were untrue or misleading, and that it acted in  
5 violation of California's False Advertising Law. Pfizer knew or should have known the  
6 true efficacy of Zoloft in treating depression as the data was compiled in Pfizer's own  
7 clinical trials of Zoloft. Pfizer, however, deliberately chose to engage in false advertising  
8 by using a misleading and deceptive drug label which had the effect of inducing Plaintiff  
9 and the California Consumer Class into purchasing and ingesting Zoloft.


10 125. Pfizer's misrepresentations of material facts related to Zoloft, as detailed  
11 above, constitute false and misleading advertising in violation of California's False  
12 Advertising Law.

13 126. In addition, Pfizer has directly advertised to Plaintiff and the California  
14 Consumer Class by representing that Zoloft is very effective at treating depression. The  
15 volume of advertisements directed at California consumers between 1991 and 2012 is  
16 substantial.

17 127. Many advertisements directed toward Plaintiff and the California  
18 Consumer Class involved a little balloon-shaped cartoon character who would bounce  
19 around feeling either depressed or happy depending on whether it had recently taken  
20 Zoloft. Pfizer broadly released commercials depicting the balloon-cartoon after 2001.

21 128. One commercial, which Plaintiff saw and relied on prior to taking Zoloft,  
22 was one of Pfizer's most successful advertisements.<sup>7</sup> The commercial was designed to  
23 convince consumers that Zoloft was very effective at treating depression. The  
24 commercial is depicted below. It begins with the balloon-cartoon looking sad under a  
25 rain cloud.

26  
27 <sup>7</sup> Full commercial available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6vfSFXXKlnO0>, last  
28 accessed on January 29, 2013 at 3:25 p.m.



8 A voice over states:

9 You know when you feel the weight of sadness.

10 [sound of rain]

11 You may feel exhausted, hopeless, and anxious.

12 [whimper]

13 Whatever you do, you feel lonely and don't enjoy the things you once  
14 loved.


15 [sad moan]

16 Things just don't feel like they used to.

17 These are some symptoms of depression: a serious medical condition  
affecting over 20 million Americans.

18 The commercial then goes into a description of how depression works, relying on the  
19 chemical imbalance theory that has been rejected by scientists.<sup>8</sup>

20  
21  
22  
23 <sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Ronald Pies, *Psychiatry's New Brain-Mind and the Legend of the 'Chemical*  
24 *Imbalance*, *Psychiatric Times*, July 11, 2011 (“[T]he ‘chemical imbalance’ image has  
25 our patients’ understanding. . . In truth, the chemical imbalance notion was always a kind  
26 of urban legend – never a theory seriously propounded by well-informed psychiatrists.”);  
27 Jeffrey R. Lacasse and Jonathan Leo, *Serotonin and Depression: A Disconnect between*  
28 *the Advertisements*, 2 *PLOS MEDICINE* 1211-16 (December 2005) (“Contemporary  
neuroscience research has failed to confirm any serotonergic lesion in any mental  
disorder, and has in fact provided significant counterevidence to the explanation of a  
simple neurotransmitter deficiency.”).



A voice over states:


[happy music starts]

While the cause is unknown, depression may be related to an imbalance of natural chemicals between nerve cells in the brain.


Prescription Zoloft works to correct this imbalance.

You just shouldn't have to feel this way anymore.

The commercial then cuts to the cartoon-character, smiling, with birds chirping.



The commercial then begins to list the various potential side-effects of taking Zoloft while the balloon-cartoon proceeds to bounce along the Zoloft logo.



8  
9 A voice over states:

10 Only your doctor can diagnose depression.

11 Zoloft is not for everyone.

12 People taking MAOI's or pimozides shouldn't take Zoloft.


13 Side effects may include dry mouth, insomnia, sexual side effects, diarrhea,  
14 nausea, and sleepiness.

15 Zoloft is not habit forming.

16 Talk to your doctor about Zoloft.

17 The number one prescribed brand of its kind.

18 The commercial finally settles on the Zoloft Logo, and touts Zoloft's efficacy in treating  
19 depression.



27 The voice over:

28 Zoloft, "When you know more about what's wrong, you can help make it right."

1           129. After seeing this commercial, the Plaintiff, like numerous consumers  
2 within California, was excited about purchasing and ingesting Zoloft. She specifically  
3 relied on this advertisement in making her decision to purchase and ingest Zoloft.  
4 Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class were misled into believing that Zoloft would  
5 be an effective and reliable drug for the treatment of their depression.

6           130. Many of the California Consumer Class members saw this famous Zoloft  
7 commercial, and Pfizer directed numerous commercials which expressed the materially  
8 same message to consumers within California.

9           131. The above described commercial and magazine ads (described in  
10 paragraphs 63-65 above) are just a few of the thousands of advertisements Pfizer directed  
11 toward the California Consumer Class designed to mislead consumers about Zoloft's  
12 efficacy.

13           132. As a result of Pfizer's deceptive and unlawful marketing of Zoloft, Pfizer  
14 has improperly and illegally obtained money from Plaintiff and the California Consumer  
15 Class.

16           133. Accordingly, pursuant to California's False Advertising Law, specifically  
17 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17535, Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class seek an  
18 order of this Court requiring Pfizer to fully disclose the true nature of its  
19 misrepresentations to consumers and healthcare professionals, disgorging Pfizer's ill-  
20 gotten gains and/or award full restitution of all monies wrongfully acquired by means of  
21 its false advertising in California, enjoining Pfizer from continuing to violate California's  
22 False Advertising Law in its sale and marketing of Zoloft, awarding those damages  
23 available under California law, and for such other relief as set forth below.

24                           **EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ALLEGATIONS**

25           134. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every prior and subsequent  
26 allegation of this Complaint as if fully restated here.

27           135. Pfizer's conduct as alleged herein was done with oppression, fraud, and  
28 malice. Pfizer was fully aware of Zoloft's true efficacy as documented in its own clinical

1 trials and internal company documents. Nonetheless, Pfizer deliberately crafted its drug  
2 label to mislead consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals into believing that  
3 Zoloft is more effective at treating depression than it actually is. This was not done by  
4 accident or through some justifiable negligence. Rather, Pfizer knew that it could turn a  
5 profit by convincing consumers and prescribing healthcare professionals that Zoloft was  
6 very effective at treating depression. This was accomplished not only through its  
7 misleading drug label, but through a comprehensive scheme of selective publishing,  
8 ghostwriting, paying KOLs, and misleading advertising as more fully alleged throughout  
9 this Complaint. Such conduct was done with a conscious disregard of the Plaintiff's, the  
10 Nationwide Class Members', and the California Consumer Class members' consumer  
11 rights.

12 136. There is no indication that Pfizer will stop its deceptive and unlawful  
13 marketing practices unless it is punished and deterred.

14 **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

15 137. Plaintiff respectfully requests a trial by jury on all claims triable as a  
16 matter of right.

17 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

18 138. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Nationwide  
19 Class described herein, prays for the following relief:

- 20 a. Find that this action satisfies the prerequisites for maintenance of a  
21 class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2),  
22 and (c)(4), and certify a Nationwide Issue and Injunctive Class  
23 described more fully herein.
- 24 b. Designate Plaintiff as a representative for the Nationwide Issue and  
25 Injunctive Class and her counsel as Class counsel.
- 26 c. Issue a judgment against Pfizer that:
- 27 i. Declares the following:
- 28



1 1. Zoloft's drug label, between 1991 to the present, was  
2 misleading or deceptive because it did not contain  
3 material information about Zoloft's efficacy, to wit, the  
4 drug label failed to provide information about the  
5 majority of clinical trials demonstrating that Zoloft was  
6 no more effective than placebo in treating depression  
7 and specify the marginal benefit to treating depression  
8 observed in the two clinical trials purporting to show  
9 Zoloft's efficacy;

10 2. Pfizer intentionally, deliberately, or recklessly created  
11 and distributed Zoloft's misleading drug label with  
12 regard to its efficacy description for depression.

13 ii. Permanently enjoins Pfizer from continuing to sell or market  
14 Zoloft with its current drug label and directing Pfizer to seek  
15 FDA approval of a new label that properly discloses Zoloft's  
16 efficacy.

17 iii. Grants Plaintiff and the Nationwide Issue and Injunctive Class  
18 reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of suit; and

19 iv. Grants Plaintiff and the Nationwide Issue and Injunctive Class  
20 such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper  
21 under the circumstances.

22 139. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the California  
23 Consumer Class described herein, prays for the following relief:

24 a. Find that this action satisfies the prerequisites for maintenance of a  
25 class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 23(a) and (b)(3),  
26 and certify a California Consumer Class described more fully herein.


27 b. Designate Plaintiff as a representative for the California Consumer  
28 Class and her counsel as Class counsel.

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- c. Issue a judgment against Pfizer that:
- i. Permanently enjoins Pfizer from performing further acts in violation of the various California Consumer Protection Statutes, alleged in Counts II, III, and IV.
  - ii. Grants Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class a refund of all moneys acquired by Pfizer by means of its deceptive and unlawful marketing of Zoloft in California;
  - iii. Grants Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class an award of restitution and/or disgorgement of Pfizer's profits from its deceptive and unlawful marketing of Zoloft in violation of the California Consumer Protection Statutes, alleged in Counts II, III, and IV;
  - iv. Grants Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class any actual or compensatory damages in such amount to be determined at trial and as provided by applicable law;
  - v. Grants Plaintiff and the California Consumer Class exemplary and punitive damages sufficient to punish and deter Pfizer and others from future deceptive and unlawful marketing practices;
  - vi. Grants Plaintiff and California Consumer Class pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
  - vii. Grants Plaintiff and California Consumer Class reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of suit; and
  - viii. Grants Plaintiff and California Consumer Class such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.

1 Dated: January 30, 2013

Respectfully Submitted,

2  
3 

4 Michael L. Baum

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*Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Classes*

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**CIVIL COVER SHEET**

JS 44 (Rev. 12/07)

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

**I. (a) PLAINTIFFS**

LAURA A. PLUMLEE, an individual, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated

**DEFENDANTS**

PFIZER, INC., a New York Corporation

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff San Jose  
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant New York  
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE LAND INVOLVED.

(c) Attorney's (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)  
BAUM, HEDLUND, ARISTEI & GOLDMAN, PC  
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Suite 950  
Los Angeles, California 90025  
(310) 207-3233

Attorneys (If Known)

**ADR**  
**E-FILING**

**CV 13-0414 PSG**

**II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION** (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff
- 2 U.S. Government Defendant
- 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)
- 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

**III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES** (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

	PTF	DEF		PTF	DEF
Citizen of This State	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	Incorporated <i>or</i> Principal Place of Business In This State	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
Citizen of Another State	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	Incorporated <i>and</i> Principal Place of Business In Another State	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 5
Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	Foreign Nation	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 6

**IV. NATURE OF SUIT** (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

CONTRACT	TORTS	FORFEITURE/PENALTY	BANKRUPTCY	OTHER STATUTES
<input type="checkbox"/> 110 Insurance	<input type="checkbox"/> 310 Airplane	<input type="checkbox"/> 610 Agriculture	<input type="checkbox"/> 422 Appeal 28 USC 158	<input type="checkbox"/> 400 State Reapportionment
<input type="checkbox"/> 120 Marine	<input type="checkbox"/> 315 Airplane Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 620 Other Food & Drug	<input type="checkbox"/> 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157	<input type="checkbox"/> 410 Antitrust
<input type="checkbox"/> 130 Miller Act	<input type="checkbox"/> 320 Assault, Libel & Slander	<input type="checkbox"/> 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881	<b>PROPERTY RIGHTS</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> 430 Banks and Banking
<input type="checkbox"/> 140 Negotiable Instrument	<input type="checkbox"/> 330 Federal Employers' Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 630 Liquor Laws	<input type="checkbox"/> 820 Copyrights	<input type="checkbox"/> 450 Commerce
<input type="checkbox"/> 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment	<input type="checkbox"/> 340 Marine	<input type="checkbox"/> 640 R.R. & Truck	<input type="checkbox"/> 830 Patent	<input type="checkbox"/> 460 Deportation
<input type="checkbox"/> 151 Medicare Act	<input type="checkbox"/> 345 Marine Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 650 Airline Regs.	<input type="checkbox"/> 840 Trademark	<input type="checkbox"/> 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
<input type="checkbox"/> 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excl. Veterans)	<input type="checkbox"/> 350 Motor Vehicle	<input type="checkbox"/> 660 Occupational Safety/Health	<b>SOCIAL SECURITY</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> 480 Consumer Credit
<input type="checkbox"/> 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits	<input type="checkbox"/> 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 690 Other	<input type="checkbox"/> 861 HIA (1395ff)	<input type="checkbox"/> 490 Cable/Sat TV
<input type="checkbox"/> 160 Stockholders' Suits	<input type="checkbox"/> 360 Other Personal Injury	<b>LABOR</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> 862 Black Lung (923)	<input type="checkbox"/> 810 Selective Service
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 190 Other Contract	<input type="checkbox"/> 370 Other Fraud	<input type="checkbox"/> 710 Fair Labor Standards Act	<input type="checkbox"/> 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g))	<input type="checkbox"/> 850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange
<input type="checkbox"/> 195 Contract Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 371 Truth in Lending	<input type="checkbox"/> 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations	<input type="checkbox"/> 864 SSID Title XVI	<input type="checkbox"/> 875 Customer Challenge 12 USC 3410
<input type="checkbox"/> 196 Franchise	<input type="checkbox"/> 380 Other Personal Property Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> 730 Labor/Mgmt. Reporting & Disclosure Act	<input type="checkbox"/> 865 RSI (405(g))	<input type="checkbox"/> 890 Other Statutory Actions
<b>REAL PROPERTY</b>	<b>CIVIL RIGHTS</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> 740 Railway Labor Act	<b>FEDERAL TAX SUITS</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> 891 Agricultural Acts
<input type="checkbox"/> 210 Land Condemnation	<input type="checkbox"/> 441 Voting	<input type="checkbox"/> 790 Other Labor Litigation	<input type="checkbox"/> 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant)	<input type="checkbox"/> 892 Economic Stabilization Act
<input type="checkbox"/> 220 Foreclosure	<input type="checkbox"/> 442 Employment	<input type="checkbox"/> 791 Empl. Ret. Inc. Security Act	<input type="checkbox"/> 871 IRS - Third Party 26 USC 7609	<input type="checkbox"/> 893 Environmental Matters
<input type="checkbox"/> 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment	<input type="checkbox"/> 443 Housing/Accommodations	<b>IMMIGRATION</b>		<input type="checkbox"/> 894 Energy Allocation Act
<input type="checkbox"/> 240 Torts to Land	<input type="checkbox"/> 444 Welfare	<input type="checkbox"/> 462 Naturalization Application		<input type="checkbox"/> 895 Freedom of Information Act
<input type="checkbox"/> 245 Tort Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 445 Amer. w/Disabilities-Employment	<input type="checkbox"/> 463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee		<input type="checkbox"/> 900 Appeal of Fee Determination Under Equal Access to Justice
<input type="checkbox"/> 290 All Other Real Property	<input type="checkbox"/> 446 Amer. w/Disabilities-Other	<input type="checkbox"/> 465 Other Immigration Actions		<input type="checkbox"/> 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes
	<input type="checkbox"/> 440 Other Civil Rights			
	<b>PRISONER PETITIONS</b>			
	<input type="checkbox"/> 510 Motion to Vacate Sentence			
	<b>Habeas Corpus:</b>			
	<input type="checkbox"/> 530 General			
	<input type="checkbox"/> 535 Death Penalty			
	<input type="checkbox"/> 540 Mandamus & other			
	<input type="checkbox"/> 550 Civil Rights			
	<input type="checkbox"/> 555 Prison Condition			

**V. ORIGIN** (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 Original Proceeding
- 2 Removed from State Court
- 3 Remanded from Appellate Court
- 4 Reinstated or Reopened
- 5 Transferred from another district (specify)
- 6 Multidistrict Litigation
- 7 Appeal to District Judge from Magistrate Judgment

**VI. CAUSE OF ACTION**

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):  
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d);

Brief description of cause:  
Drug Related Consumer Protection

**VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:**

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION DEMAND \$ TBD  
UNDER F.R.C.P. 23  CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:  
JURY DEMAND:  Yes  No

**VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY**

(See instructions):

DATE  
January 30, 2013

JUDGE

DOCKET NUMBER

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

Michael L. Baum, Esq.

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # \_\_\_\_\_ AMOUNT \_\_\_\_\_ APPLYING IFP \_\_\_\_\_ JUDGE \_\_\_\_\_ MAG. JUDGE \_\_\_\_\_